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RULES, STANDARDS, AND THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS:
A REASSESSMENT OF § 2-207
Douglas G. Baird*
Robert Weisberg**

B

UYERS and sellers of commercial goods sometimes bargain
only on basic matters such as price and delivery date, and
leave the details of the transaction, including warranties and arbitration provisions, to standardized term in preprinted forms. The
buyer's and seller's forms do not coincide, and may even contradict
one another, creating two types of disputes for courts to resolve.
First, one party may seek to renege on the deal before performance
and may point to inconsistencies between the purchase order and
the acknowledgment to show that the minds of the parties never
met clearly enough to form a contract.1 In such a case, a court fac* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A., 1975, Yale University; J.D.,
1979, Stanford University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University. B.A., 1966, City College of New York;
Ph.D., 1971, Harvard University;, J.D., 1979, Stanford University. We would like to thank
Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, Daniel Ernst, Thomas Jackson, Edmund Kitch, Douglas Laycock, Phil Neal, Alan Schwartz, Robert Scarborough, and Geoffrey Stone for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
For example, a maker of gaskets orders 100 pounds of rubber and uses a purchase order
drafted by its lawyer. The order form might be silent on the warranty question, or it might
say that "Seller warrants goods suitable for use in the manufacture of gaskets." The rubber
manufacturer, in return, sends an acknowledgment form that disclaims all warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability (U.C.C. § 2-314) and the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose (U.C.C. § 2-315). The parties explicitly agree on a delivery
date six months in the future. After the exchange of forms but before delivery, a sudden
worldwide shortage of rubber causes the price of the commodity to triple. Seller then tries
to avoid selling to the gasket manufacturer at the now bargain price. He asserts that no
contract exists between the parties because his form and that of the buyer disagree on the
issue of warranty.
The practicing commercial lawyer frequently confronts a client that has exchanged forms
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ing disagreement between two printed forms must decide whether
a contract even exists. Second, after the seller has sent the goods
or the buyer has used them, the parties may fall into dispute over
a term on which the forms failed to agree. In these cases where
the parties have already performed, the court must supply a term
that the parties never agreed on; the court may have to decide, for
example, which party will bear the loss resulting from a defect in

and wants to know whether it is bound. Yet few disputes of this type arising under the Code
are reported. There are two possible explanations. First, even a sudden shift in market
price, such as occurred with cotton in 1973, might result in a potential gain or loss to a party
of only a few thousand dollars. This difference may not be enough to justify litigating a case
to the point where there is a reported decision. But see Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop.
Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1976); Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th
Cir. 1974). Even if a party thought it had a right to renege on a deal because of terms buried
in fine print, as long as the stakes were not high it might decline to do so because such
behavior might be seen as sharp practice and hurt its reputation among other customers.
Second, the outcome of these cases-the finding that a contract does exist-is clear under
the Code. A court has even found a contract after an exchange of documents when the
dispute was over a term in one of the forms that would have changed the price by 30%.
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Auburn Plastics, Inc., 67 A.D.2d 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 50
(1979).
Though in principle battles of the forms might arise in consumer transactions, such cases
are rare. We assume throughout this article that the parties involved are merchants, and
thus that the special concerns that arise when a consumer is a party are not present.
2 This type of case is litigated much more frequently than the first. Most of the disputes
involve a warranty disclaimer in one of the forms, see, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. StaffordHiggins, Co., 366 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co.,
- Ind. App. -, 380 N.E.2d 571 (1978), or a term in one of the forms mandating arbitration
in the event of a dispute, see, e.g., Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d
327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978). Cases have arisen in which one of the forms
included an indemnity clause, Furtado v. Woburn Mach. Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 760, 768 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1976); in which a form required the other party to pay
attorneys' fees in the event of litigation, Cement Asbestos Prods. Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 592 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1979); and in which one of the forms sought to set New
York as the jurisdiction in which any disputes would be litigated, National Mach. Exch.,
Inc. v. Peninsular Equip. Corp., 106 Misc. 2d 458, 431 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1980). All
these clauses have been found to be "material" (thus materially altering the contract), as
have those in most recent cases involving disclaimers and arbitration under U.C.C. § 2207(2), see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), was the first reported
decision under 2-207, and its facts were prototypical of the second type of battle of the
forms dispute. The buyer ordered a drum of glue from the seller, stating that it needed the
glue for "wet pack spinach bags." The seller, however, acknowledged the order with a form
that bore the conspicuous legend, "All goods sold without warranties, express or implied."
In smaller type, the seller purported to limit its liability to replacement of any glue that
proved defective. The glue subsequently failed to adhere, a large amount of spinach apparently perished, and the buyer sought to impose this loss on the seller.
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the goods or whether the dispute will go to arbitration. Each of
these two types of disputes is commonly called a "battle of the
forms."
These disputes arise only when the parties do not explicitly
dicker over the terms at issue. Thus, the law cannot resolve the
battle of the forms with a simple inquiry into the parties' intent."
It is useless to ask what terms the parties intended to govern this
transaction. 5 The buyer and seller were content to leave their mutual rights uncertain, because greater certainty would have come
only with negotiations, the cost of which probably would have exceeded the expected cost of leaving things open to dispute.
The law cannot avoid choosing among terms that the parties
never explicitly agreed on; any approach to the battle of the forms
that allows each party to insist on its own contract terms is
doomed to failure. If, for example, the buyer wants a warranty on
the goods and the seller does not, the lawmaker has several
choices. A rule could say that the buyer wins, that the seller wins,
that the first party to send its form wins, or that the last party to
3 A court cannot dodge the issue in such situations by asserting that no contract was ever
formed despite performance. However the court characterizes its decision, it supplies the
missing term. Once the court decides that no contract exists, it still must decide whether the
buyer should pay for the goods it used and whether it must return the goods it has not used.
Supplying a term is the same as deciding the relative rights and obligations of the parties,
and this much the court is obliged to do once it has jurisdiction over the dispute.
4 Dean Murray forcefully argues that battle of the forms disputes can and should be determined by referring to the "bargain-in-fact" of the parties. See Murray, Section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 597, 601-02 (1978). Our point of difference with Dean Murray is not that the
inquiry he thinks courts should engage in is necessarily the wrong one, but rather that it is a
necessarily imprecise one. See infra text accompanying note 60.
I It is also of limited value even to have a legal rule that determines whether a contract
exists by focusing exclusively on the parties' intent. The intent of the parties may not be
independent of the legal rule. As is true in many areas of the law, when parties do reflect on
the legal consequences of their acts, their expectations depend in some measure on what
they assume the legal rule to be. If, for example, as a matter of common knowledge, courts
enforced only those contracts executed under a seal, parties would never think they had
formed binding contracts unless they had used a seal. Where the rules of contract formation
are less certain, the intent of the parties may be no more than their rough prediction of how
the court will treat their exchange.
This, of course, is not to say that noncontractual elements are not of great importance.
See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55 (1963). More recent empirical work, however, suggests that parties are aware of the
legal consequences of documents that differ. See Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 Brit. J. L. & Soc'y 45, 50 (1975).
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send its form wins. No rule of law, however, can allow both parties
to prevail. Likewise, a rule that purports to enforce one party's
clause saying "My terms govern or there is no deal" cannot resolve
the many cases where both parties have such a clause and the deal
has already gone through.
This article joins an extensive literature examining the Uniform
Commercial Code's response to the battle of the forms-U.C.C. §
2-207.1 The conventional wisdom of the commentators on 2-207
runs roughly as follows: The drafters of 2-207 had the salutary, indeed the unexceptionable purpose of overcoming the rigidity of
one of the oldest and most mechanical common-law rules of offer
and acceptance-the mirror-image rule. The commentators argue,
however, that serious drafting errors, 7 compounded by occasional

6 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978). In addition to Dean Murray's contributions, see Murray, supra
note 4; Murray, Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section 60,
Restatement of Contracts, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 317 (1969), the commentary of commercial
law scholars includes the relevant section from Professors White's and Summers' hornbook,
J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2,
at 24-39 (2d ed. 1980), and the discussion of 2-207 in 3 R. Duesenberg & L. King, Sales &
Bulk Transfers under the Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3.01-.09 (1980). Articles on 2-207
include Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 171 (1975); Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. Law. 75
(1963); Hawkland, Major Changes under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Formation
and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 Prac. Law. 73 (May 1964); Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus.
Law. 789 (1969); Taylor, U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Integration of Legal Abstractions and
Transactional Reality, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 419 (1977). Student comments on the battle of the
forms include Note, In Defense of the Battle of Forms: Curing the "First Shot" Flaw in
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 Notre Dame Law. 384 (1973); Comment,
A Look at a Strict Construction of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code from the
Seller's Point of View or What's So Bad About Roto-Lith?, 8 Akron L. Rev. 111 (1974);
Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An End to the Battle of the Forms, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 540 (1963). See also 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 1481 (1963); 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132 (1962).
7 Grant Gilmore, one of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (though not of 2207), said that, if anything, commentators have been too forgiving of 2-207: "[They] treat
the section much too respectfully-as if it had sprung, all of a piece, like Minerva from the
brow of Jove. The truth is that it was a miserable, bungled, patched-up job-both text and
comment-to which various hands-Llewellyn, Honnold, Braucher and my anonymous
hack-contributed at various points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind
men and the elephant). It strikes me as ludicrous to pretend that the section can, or should,
be construed as an integrated whole in the light of what 'the draftsman' 'intended.'" Letter
from Grant Gilmore to Robert Summers (Sept. 10, 1980), in R. Speidel, R. Summers & J.
White, Teaching Materials on Commercial and Consumer Law 54-55 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore Letter].
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judicial errors, have hampered 2-207's effectiveness and contravened the drafters' purpose in a significant number of cases.8 This
article shows that the conventional wisdom is wrong or, at least,
seriously incomplete.
We argue that 2-207 and the battle of the forms must be understood in light of a fundamental question in jurisprudencewhether to use formal "rules" or open-ended "standards" to resolve the mutual rights of private parties. The drafters of the Code
intended to do more than overcome the formalist excesses of the
mirror-image rule; indeed, that purpose only poorly explains the
history and final language of 2-207. Instead, the drafters sought to
break dramatically with traditional formal rules of offer and acceptance and, with those rules, dependence on the parties' documented expressions. The drafters sought to treat the battle of the
forms with an open-textured "standard" similar to the one they
applied to another recurrent problem in contract formation-the
case where the parties have unquestionably contracted but have
left some of the terms of their agreement incomplete.
a Roto-Lith is the 2-207 case most frequently criticized. Th~ugh recently embraced by a
lower federal court in the First Circuit, Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 546 (D. Mass. 1977), it has been rejected in most of the jurisdictions that have considered the issues it raises. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan
Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453
F.2d 1161, 1168 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366
F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 107, 569 P.2d 751,
763, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 168 (1977); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., - Ind.
App. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 578.
As we are using the term, some cases that discuss 2-207 are not battle of the forms cases
at all. In these cases, the parties exchange documents, but they advert to the differences
they have rather than leave them to fine print. In these situations, the court's inquiry is
simply a factual one. For example, when two parties exchange telegrams and one proposes
that delivery be "FOB our truck your plant loaded," and the other responds that he will sell
only on an "as is-where is" basis, the court can decide, as a factual matter, whether the
parties in the face of such a disagreement intended to do business with one another. See,
e.g., Koehring Co. v. Glowacki, 77 Wis. 2d 497, 504-05, 253 N.W.2d 64, 67-68 (1977). Similarly, when parties have a dispute over the delivery date and the offeree adds in a handwritten note to its acceptance form that the parties will resolve their differences, one can ask as
a factual matter whether the parties thought they had a contract, the details of which were
unclear, or whether they were still negotiating. See, e.g., Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v.
Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 502, 567 P.2d 1246, 1253 (1977).
Other cases arising under 2-207 that are not battle of the forms disputes involve explicit
dickering before the exchange of documents over terms that are later the subject of dispute,
or involve exchanges of forms that take place after the parties have agreed to do business
with one another. See infra note 48.
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The drafters decided, however, to put 2-207 to double-duty.
They wrote the section to resolve not only battles of the forms, but
also disputes in which the parties make a binding oral agreement
and later disagree when they attempt to record or fine-tune the
agreement through post-bargain "confirming letters." The drafters
chose to resolve this type of dispute with a relatively formal rule,
yet the final language of 2-207 applies the formal rule to both confirmation cases and battles of the forms. Most of the flaws that the
commentators have seen in the Code's treatment of the battle of
the forms stem from this intrusion of a formal rule in situations
that the drafters initially intended to resolve with a flexible
standard.
Nevertheless, the judicial history of 2-207 in battle of the forms
cases reveals that the courts have generally overcome these flaws
and have construed 2-207 consistently with the drafters' intent though at the sacrifice of literal construction of the section's language. To determine whether a contract exists, courts in practice
look at the terms that the parties expressly agreed on and then
decide whether agreement on these terms shows that a contract
was in the mutual interest of the parties, viewed ex ante. When the
agreement leaves certain terms of the contract in dispute, courts
supply the terms that the Code posits parties would have agreed to
had they dickered over them.9 We conclude then that, if one accepts the drafters' goals for 2-207, redrafting its language may be
unnecessary.
We challenge, however, the assumption of many commentators 0
9 This is not to say, however, that courts always reject the fine-print terms. We include
the many cases in which the court adopts the fine print in one party's form but in which
these terms coincide with those the Code would supply. See infra text accompanying notes
73-74.
10 See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 6, at 78 ("This, then, was the commercial reality with
which the common law of offer and acceptance had not kept pace. An updating of the law to
bring it into alignment with commercial practice was in order."); Taylor, supra note 6, at
425-26 ("The problem with this approach is twofold: the analytical legal construct of the
transaction bears little resemblance to reality. In addition, it is evident that commercial
practice will not change to conform with the legal construct.").
Frederick Lipman argues that the mirror-image rule might be preferable to 2-207, but
thinks the mirror-image rule itself could be profitably combined with a rule similar to the

one now in 2-207(3). See Lipman, supra note 6, at 806-07.

The mirror-image rule still survives in England. See Butler Mach. Tool Co. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp. (England), [1979] 1 W.L.R. 401 (C.A. 1977). At least one commentator there urges its
retention. Rawlings, The Battle of Forms, 42 Mod. L. Rev. 715, 721 (1979) ("[I]t seems that
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that the goal of 2-207 is correct and argue that the formalist principles of offer and acceptance underlying the mirror-image rule are
fundamentally sound. Commentators assume that the mirror-image rule cannot resolve the problem of the welsher satisfactorily,
but the problem of the party that wants to back out of a bargain
on a technicality can be handled within the framework of the mirror-image rule and does not require abandoning the very idea of a
rule, as the Code's drafters intended. Perhaps more important, the
mirror-image rule may yield a better result than 2-207 in the second battle of the forms problem, in which both parties have performed and a dispute exists over terms. In theory, at least, formal
rules such as the mirror-image rule allow parties to a contract to
avoid the off-the-rack terms the Code supplies in the absence of
express agreement; such ready-made terms may be poorly suited to
the transaction and consequently advance the interest of neither
party. Compared with 2-207, the mirror-image rule encourages parties to adapt the terms in their forms to the needs and abilities of
buyers and sellers in their particular market. Thus, we believe that
a formal rule of contract formation, applied consistently in battles
of the forms, may produce terms that are better suited to particular transactions than does 2-207.
I. RuLEs, STANDARDS,

AND THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS

The text of 2-207 at first glance seems straightforward and
plausible:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become
part of the contract unless:
the real strength or weakness of the traditional approach to the Battle of Forms will only be
known when more research has been done into the attitudes and expectations of the belligerents involved. It is submitted that meanwhile the traditional analysis should be retained. Although that analysis suffers from certain drawbacks, it is suggested that the deftciencies of alternative solutions should preclude those solutions from adoption by the
courts.").
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(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially Alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In
such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary
terms incorporated under any other provisions of
this Act. 1
Moreover, most commentators find the implicit purpose of 2-207
to be quite clear: strict rules of offer and acceptance governed a
battle of the forms at common law, and 2-207 is designed to over12
turn one of the hoariest of those rules-the mirror-image rule.
Nevertheless, most commentators also agree that 2-207 is a statu3
tory disaster whose every word invites problems in construction.?
A few examples from subsection (1) readily suggest how many
questions the drafters left unresolved. Subsection (1) tells us that
"an expression of acceptance" operates as an "acceptance" even if
it includes "additional" or "different" terms. Unless a responding
party makes the expression of acceptance "expressly conditional,"
assent to the basic tenor of an offer creates a contract, even if the
responding party sets forth terms that are not in the offer or are
different from the terms of the offer.1 4 Yet at some point, an of"

U.C.C.

§

2-207 (1978).

,2 See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 25; Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 6, at 178-79; Davenport, supra note 6, at 77-78. Dean Murray argues that 2-207 was

only meant to prevent the mirror-image rule from operating beyond its rationale, Murray,
supra note 4, at 601-02, and that 2-207 actually preserves the mirror-image rule in the broad

sense that to create a contract the acknowledgment must agree with the offer on all dickered terms and must objectively reflect a definite intention to accept, Murray, The Article 2
Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Wash-

burn L.J. 1, 8-9 (1981). Later in this article, we suggest that at common law the mirrorimage rule typically did not operate to prevent the recognition of a contract where the parties had achieved what Dean Murray calls a "bargain-in-fact." See infra notes 46-52 and
accompanying text.

Is Two of the most comprehensive discussions of the problems facing a court interpreting
2-207 are 3 R. Duesenberg & L. King, supra note 6, § 3.03, and J. White & R. Summers,
supra note 6, § 1-2.
14 See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System v. Auburn Plastics, Inc., 67 A.D.2d 811, 413
N.Y.S.2d 50 (1979) (holding that a responding document including 30% surcharge for "engineering services" was nevertheless effective as acceptance under 2-207(1)).
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feree's document, though it contains no "expressly conditional"
language, may contain terms so "different" from those of the offer
that the document no longer seems to be an "expression of acceptance." But how does a court or a party tell when the difference is
too large?1
In any event, what does it mean to make one's "expression of
acceptance" "expressly conditional"?1 " Is it enough to say, perhaps
in fine print, "This acceptance is expressly conditional"? If it is
enough, what prevents parties from always using such language?
Why should such buried language control the bargain, when other,
similarly buried terms do not? If, on the other hand, one reads into
the section a requirement that "expressly conditional" language be
obvious, two further problems emerge. First, the requirement of
obviousness introduces further uncertainty and seems to make
consistent application of 2-207 even more difficult. Second, it
makes the section redundant. Any language that obviously makes
an agreement conditional on the other party's consent to a particular term should keep the document from operating as an "expression of acceptance" in the first place. 17 These do not exhaust the

"IPerhaps a response is conditional when the difference in terms is so great as to suggest
that even had the parties been free of all negotiating costs, they could not possibly have
dickered their way into agreement on the unsettled term ("I will sell you the Rolls-Royce
you offered to buy, but at $100,000, not $10,000."). See Murray, supra note 4, at 604. Yet
what of cases where the difference in forms is less dramatic? For example, where the parties
fail to agree on who will bear the cost of a defect, how does one measure whether the buyer
would take the goods without a warranty (with an adjustment in price) or whether the seller
would sell them with a warranty?
The courts have partly answered this last question, at least where the difference is over
warranties. See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 30. Most cases ask
whether a disclaimer becomes part of the contract, but ask that question only after they
decide that the documents form a contract despite the presence of a disclaimer. See, e.g., Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
" Roto-Lith held that "a response which states a condition materially altering the obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an 'acceptance ... expressly ... conditional on assent to the additional ... terms."' 297 F.2d at 500 (ellipses in original). Most
cases since have declared that to be "expressly conditional," the acceptance must clearly
reveal that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured of
the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms. See, e.g., Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1979); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972).
" In any event, neither interpretation of the phrase "expressly conditional" explains what
the terms of the contract should be if the parties fall into dispute after the goods are
shipped and used. Is a document with terms that are made expressly conditional a counteroffer that is accepted, if at all, only when the goods are sent or used? Or does subsection (3)
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questions left unresolved by subsection (1), and, as we note below,
subsection (2) is an equally easy target for critics of statutory
18

drafting.

For nearly three decades, commentators have struggled to solve

these problems and to reconcile their solutions with those of other
commentators and with their own principles of jurisprudence.1 '
More than one has concluded that the questions are unanswerable,
and that we should abandon the present version of 2-207 and write
another.2 0 Yet however flawed the language of 2-207 may be, courts

must still make the best of an admittedly bad job and interpret 2207 as consistently as possible with the intent of the drafters.
Moreover, the commentators have not critically examined the
widely assumed purpose of 2-207 as a possible source of the oft-

govern because the writings "do not establish a contract"?
In Roto-Lith, the court found language in the seller's form to be expressly conditional, but
did not discuss the applicability of 2-207(3). 297 F.2d at 499. Subsection (3), of course,
would have been irrelevant if Massachusetts had enacted the 1952 version of the Code,
which did not include that subsection. Massachusetts, however, had enacted the 1957 version, which did include 2-207(3). See 1957 Mass. Acts 778 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 106, § 2-207(3) (West 1958)). Most commentators have assumed that in the ordinary
battle of the forms case, acknowledgments that fail as acceptances are not counteroffers and
that subsection (3) controls. Dean Murray suggests though that the acknowledgment containing inconsistent terms ought to be treated as a genuine counteroffer that is accepted
when the goods are accepted. He offers as an example the case in which seller sends the
following note to buyer, who both reads and understands it:
We can ship the goods described in your order. The price and delivery terms are
acceptable. However, we cannot assume the risk of the implied warranty of
merchantability or other implied warranties. Moreover, we cannot subject ourselves
to liability for consequential damages. Recognizing your desire to have the goods
within one week, we will ship the goods within two days which should insure their
arrival in accordance with your order. If you do not wish to accept the terms of this
counter-offer, simply reject the goods and return the shipment to us at our cost.
Murray, supra note 4, at 625-26. Such cases, however, are unlikely to arise when preprinted
forms are involved; in addition, the parties receiving the forms probably will not have the
authority to change language in the company's form. One wonders nonetheless whether in
an era of word processing the unquestioning distinction between typewritten terms and
nondickered terms in fine print can persist.
"I See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
I0 See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 26 ("The law as to terms must
be sophisticated enough to nullify the efforts of fine-print lawyers, it must be sufficiently
reliance-oriented to protect the legitimate expectations of the parties, and it must be fair
and even handed."); Taylor, supra note 6, at 420-21 ("Nonconcurrence of operative concepts
and transactional realities is revealed vividly by a current commercial practice known as the
'battle of the forms.' ").
20 See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 206-07; Shaw, U.C.C. § 2-207: Two Alternative Proposals for Change, 13 Am. Bus. L.J. 185, 195-98 (1975).
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noted difficulties in construing the section. A fresh search into the
origins of 2-20721 may offer a fuller understanding of the drafters'
intent and demonstrate, surprisingly, that the courts have generally been true to that intent.
A.

The Choice Between Formal Rules and Open Standards
The evolution from the common-law rules of offer and acceptance to 2-207 marks a major shift from formal rules to relatively
unconstraining legal standards. Therefore, we begin with a brief
review of how "rules" and "standards" governing private transactions differ in both principle and practice.
In establishing and applying criteria for resolving contract disputes, legislatures and courts generally try to encourage people to
engage in mutually beneficial transactions. This truism simply
states an end and leaves lawmakers with the difficult choice of
means. On the one hand, people may feel most encouraged to
transact when they have seen the judiciary carry out their wishes
and intentions in particular cases. Courts and legislatures that take
this view would create very general criteria that leave judges broad
power to examine the circumstances of particular cases-to see
whether the parties indeed struck a bargain and to identify the
terms on which the parties' minds met. On the other hand, attempting to recognize the bargain-in-fact in every case might breed
uncertainty about the likely outcome of contract cases and thus
discourage people from entering into transactions. Lawmakers
therefore might prefer to create formal rules of contract formation,
and the courts might enforce these rules rigidly.
The tension between these two approaches to contract law is, of
course, a tension in all jurisprudence. In most fields of law, legislatures and courts must choose between what can most usefully be
called "standards" and "rules." A "standard" in this sense is a
guide to conduct that announces the government's social or economic goals in regulating that conduct and that permits courts
21 Our inquiry delves back further into the drafting history than most studies of 2-207,
which have begun with the hearings that followed the writing of the 1952 draft of Article 2.
Professors Spiedel, Summers, and White review the drafting changes in 2-207 after the promulgation of the 1952 Official Draft. See R. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Teaching
Materials on Commercial and Consumer Law 42-45 (3d ed. 1981). Professor Gilmore has
pointed out that review of the history before the 1952 draft would be useful. Gilmore Letter,
supra note 7.
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broad discretion in applying those goals directly in particular
cases. A "rule," in contrast, is a very specifically framed guide to
conduct that is detailed in its normative content and that the
lawmaker believes will directly implement his social or economic
goals. These categories, of course, appear terribly abstract in the
face of actual legal problems. Nevertheless, numerous writers have
found them useful tools of legal analysis and have compared their
advantages and disadvantages by considering their theoretical bases 22 or by imagining their practical costs and benefits. 23
Dean Murray has been perhaps the most ardent proponent of
the view that Article 2 generally favors the "standards" approach.
The Code, he stresses, eschews formal rules that focus on the precise language of the parties' documents.2 Instead, it invites and
requires courts to look to all available evidence of the parties' intent, including their course of dealing and the customs of their
trade, to uncover the essential bargain-in-fact:
The true bargain in fact must be laid bare because only it is deserving of the legally recognized status of a "contract" between the
parties-only the bargain-in-fact should be made operative by the
25
courts.

The true agreement, in this view, is a living organism subject to
growth through modifications of the parties' expression and conduct. The formal writings are but one stage in the life of the agreement and offer only a partial description of it:
All of these... manifestations of the underlying philosophy of
22

See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.

1685, 1687-1713 (1976).
23 See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Leg. Stud. 257
(1974).
Although the comparison of rules and standards has been helpful in many varied areas of
the law, it has proved of special interest in areas of private transactions where formal rules
can play a unique role. Any rule designed to control social or economic conduct runs the risk
of being arbitrarily over- or under-inclusive. Yet where private parties have the opportunity
to learn formal legal rules and organize their actions and relationships accordingly, they can
mitigate the over- or under-inclusiveness of such rules and thereby participate in carrying
out the legislature's goals. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 1697-99. This special relationship
between the government and private parties in the context of formal legal rules adds particular importance to the "standards vs. rules" debate in the field of commercial contracts.
" Murray, supra note 4, at 597-601, 645-51. See also Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 621 (1975).
15 Murray, supra note 4, at 647 (emphasis in original).
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Article 2 (and attendant sections of Article 1) manifest the same
goal: a more precise and fair identification of the actual or presumed intent of the parties.
. . . Any other goal is hostile to the nature of intention, bargain
and assent. The only other possible route to fairness is the government administered contract which not only strips the "agreement"
well prove to be unworkof individual freedom of choice but may
2
able and, therefore, ultimately unfair.
Even though the open-ended bargain-in-fact approach is obvious
in such Code provisions as those governing contract formation in
general2 7 and means of offer and acceptance,2 8 we know that the
bargain-in-fact is not the alpha and omega of commercial contract
law. The Code itself contemplates that judges will look to formal
rules in a way that ignores an indisputable bargain-in-fact. Though
the Code defines an agreement as the bargain of the parties in
fact,2" it views a contract as "the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and other
applicable rules of law."' 0 Thus, the Code takes the view that it is
sometimes better to respect the formal integrity of writings than to
recognize the bargain-in-fact. Under the statute of frauds, for example, a court may refuse to enforce a bargain in the face of overwhelming evidence that the parties reached agreement, simply because no adequate writing reflects that bargain.$1 Similarly, under
the parol evidence rule, the court may ignore certain terms on
which the parties agreed and instead enforce a different or more
limited agreement that is incorporated into a writing.32
In theory, such rules may reduce litigation costs - which the
parties do not fully bear and thus have insufficient incentive to
avoid-by reducing the scope of the evidence that the parties may
present at trial. Yet a fundamental value of such rules often goes
unrecognized. In deliberately overlooking the fact or terms of actual agreements in certain cases, such rules promote beneficial
transactions in the long-run by inducing greater certainty in the

17

Id. at 648-49.
U.C.C. § 2-204 (1978).

Id. § 2-206.
" Id. § 1-201(3).

Id.

§ 1-201(11).

Id. § 2-201.
" Id. § 2-202.
31
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legal supervision of commercial contracts.
To understand better this aspect of formal legal rules, one must
turn to the classic statement of the role of legal formalities in private law: Lon Fuller's article "Consideration and Form."3 3 Fuller
notes the two most widely recognized functions of legal formalities:
the "cautionary" function and the "evidentiary" function." Such
rules as the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule are "cautionary" because, by forcing parties to commit all or part of an
agreement to writing, they induce the parties to contemplate carefully the practical significance and likely legal consequences of
their actions.3 5 Both rules are "evidentiary," because they help to
ensure a written record on which a court can rely in making findings of fact.3 6
37
Fuller notes, however, that most analyses of legal formality
overlook one of its most important functions-what he helpfully
calls the "channeling function."3 8 A legal formality may do more
than caution the parties against inadequately considered action
and ensure a factual record for later litigation. By providing a formal legal vessel into which a businessman can fit his actions or
intentions, the rule enables the businessman to assure himself that
he has achieved an enforceable bargain; the vessel itself serves as
protection against the uncertain inclinations of the courts.3 9 A person entering into an agreement always runs the risk that a
factfinder will fail to recognize the agreement that occurred or will
enforce one that did not occur. A businessman wants to reduce this
risk, and it may benefit him to lose the value of a bargain-in-fact
in a particular case where he carelessly ignored a legal formality, if
the formal approach of the court in denying him that value gives
him a certain means of testing the enforceability of future bargains. A universally or systematically recognized legal form for an
33 Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941). For a listing of authorities discussing the rationale of legal formalities, see id. at 800 n.4.
34 Id. at 800.
35 See id.

36 Id.
37 Id. at 801.

38 Id. Fuller notes that "[i]n all legal systems the effort is to find definite marks which
shall at once include the promises which ought to be enforceable, exclude those which ought
not to be, and signalize those which will be." Id. at 801 n.5 (quoting Llewellyn, What Price
Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 738 (1931)).
39 Id. at 801-02.
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intention to contract assures the party that his intent will be
respected and thus encourages him to enter into contracts in the
future.4 °
Because they may cause courts to overlook the bargain-in-fact
and because they are inevitably over- or under-broad, formal rules
have been fairly suspect in contemporary contract law. Yet Fuller's
idea of the channeling function clarifies the purpose and value of
contract formalities. Although formal rules may ignore the bargain-in-fact in particular cases, adherence to such rules furthers
the goal of promoting mutually beneficial transactions-a goal that
proponents of the bargain-in-fact view presumably share. Because
contracting parties have a strong incentive to order their transactions to conform to the specific rules, the parties themselves can
mitigate the apparent imprecision of these rules.4 1
B.

The Mirror-Image Rule and the Battle of the Forms

As conceived in conventional legal history, the mirror-image rule
was a paradigm of legal formality that worked roughly as follows in
battle of the forms cases. One of the parties would send an offer,
often in the form of a purchase order. If the other party sent a
40 As Fuller notes, the most fundamental of such forms is language itself. Id. at 802. Regardless of any requirement of a writing, a party must commit his intention to recognizable
words and, if he does so, he improves the chance that a court will enforce that intention.
Language is perhaps the least arbitrary of legal forms, since the words chosen to "channel"
intention to form a contract will bear a natural descriptive relationship to contractual intention. In contrast, the seal-perhaps the best example of a traditional channeling formality-may bear no descriptive relationship to intention to contract, except in the most
strained metaphoric sense. Yet once lawmakers declare that a seal signifies the intention to
make a contract, a party knows that courts will recognize all sealed agreements and reject all
unsealed agreements.
Fuller properly notes that the channeling function usually overlaps with the cautionary
and evidentiary functions. Id. at 804. A rule that performs one function will usually perform
the others. Nevertheless the distinction is important. It serves an historical purpose, since a
rule poorly explained by one function may be readily explained by the others. Precisely
because placing a seal on paper is not a natural expression of intent to contract, the seal
does not make much sense as an evidentiary tool-except circularly-but it makes a great
deal of sense as a cautionary or channeling tool. More important, the distinction among the
functions becomes crucial in borderline cases, which may be decided by the court's preference for one function over another. Id. The court may not be concerned about enhancing the
cautionary function of a formal rule among practiced merchants whom we presume to be
cautious in entering into contracts; yet the court may want to enforce a formality because its
channeling value will enhance commerce.
41 See supra note 22.
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document in response, that document had to mirror the terms of
the offer exactly. Otherwise, despite its general tenor of acceptance, it would not be an acceptance, but rather a counteroffer. Because preprinted forms rarely coincided, the exchange of forms
would fail to create a contract, and neither party would be bound
before performance. If the parties did perform, the original offeror
in the transaction would be deemed to have accepted the terms of
the counteroffer when (as seller) it shipped the goods or when (as
buyer) it accepted delivery.'2
According to most critics, the sole virtue of this rule was its certainty.'3 Because a contract existed only when the forms exactly
coincided, courts could easily decide when a contract existed and
when it did not. This virtue, however, was inseparable from the
rule's principal vice: arbitrary and formalistic decisions. The critics
charge that courts, pointing to trivial differences in the documents,
would routinely find that no contract existed and thus would allow
the party responding to the offer to back out of a deal that the
offeror might reasonably have assumed to be binding. Where the
parties had performed, the critics charged, the courts would bind
the original offeror to terms buried in the fine print of the ac42 Williston discusses the mirror-image rule in these terms. See 1 S. Williston, The Law of
Contracts § 73, at 128 (lst ed. 1920). He wrote that:
In order to make a bargain it is necessary that the acceptor shall give in return for
the offeror's promise exactly the consideration which the offeror requests. . . . If a
promise is requested that promise must be made absolutely and unqualifiedly. This
does not mean necessarily that the precise words of the requested promise must be
repeated, but by a positive and unqualified assent to the proposal the acceptor must
in effect agree to make precisely the promise requested; and if any provision is added
to which the offeror did not assent, the consequence is not merely that this provision
is not binding and that no contract is formed; but that the offer is rejected.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Some of the commentators who have discussed the mirror-image
rule since 'include 3 R. Duesenberg & L. King, supra note 6, § 3.02; R. Nordstrom, Handbook of the Law of Sales § 36, at 92-93 (1970); Barron & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 175-76;
Davenport, supra note 6, at 76-78.
43 The following critique is typical:
The alleged virtue of the mirror image rule was that it promoted greater certainty
between the parties.... The assumption on which this theory was based had to be
that both parties were aware, not only of each and every term in the the [sic] other
party's offer or acceptance, but of each and every term contained in their own offer or
acceptance. While such certainty might have been attainable in a time when commercial contracts were personally negotiated and original documents created for each
transaction, it is not difficult to see that the complexity and needs of the modern
commercial transaction made such knowledge virtually impossible.
Barron & Dunfee, supra note 6, at 176.
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knowledgment (i.e., the "counter-offer"). The courts thereby established an arbitrary rule that the acknowledgment, or "last shot," in
a battle of the forms would always win." The application of the
mirror-image rule to this second type of battle of the forms problem was subject to less attention than the first, however. Under 2207, it has proved the more common sort of dispute, yet critics of
the mirror-image rule only mention it as an afterthought. Instead,
they focus their attention on cases in which, before performance,
courts used the mirror-image rule to find that no contract
existed.4

Although the common-law courts might have applied the mirrorimage rule mechanically in these situations to permit welshing, the
simple historical truth is that they did not." When a party sought
44 See, e.g., Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass. 72, 58 N.E. 174 (1900) (Holmes, C.J.).

4' See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915),
which held that a seller's acknowledgment of the buyer's original offer was not an acceptance because the buyer's subsequent confirmation of the order included a clause requiring
that seller acknowledge the order. Thus, the contract failed because seller never acknowledged receipt of the later form. See infra note 52.
4' Some critics of the mirror-image rule note that it did have exceptions. See, e.g., Barron
& Dunfee, supra note 6, at 175 & n.15 ("While not all courts felt comfortable with such a
strict formulation and some sought fictions to avoid its application, by and large the requirement was rigidly enforced." (footnotes omitted)). These authors cited two exceptions in
particular: (1) insertion of a term which would have been implied in fact from the offer, and
(2) stipulations in conformity with trade usage. Id. See also Davenport, supra note 6, at 77
("Two exceptions did serve, however, to mitigate the rigor of the rule. One was that a variance in the acceptance implied in any event by law did not alter the offer. Another was that
the variance was frequently disregarded if it was not raised initially as grounds for refusal to
perform and therefore under the circumstances clearly evidencing its afterthought character
as that of a party trying to escape the consequences of a contract on any available ground
whatever." (footnotes omitted)); Lipman, supra note 6, at 791-92 (noting that courts generally found exceptions to the mirror-image rule in the following circumstances: "(1) parol
evidence in the form of trade usages or other facts might be used to explain an apparent
variance; (2) if the purported acceptance stated only the legal implications of the offer; (3) if
the purported aceptance [sic] contained only a request or other precatory language; (4) if
the variance was immaterial." (footnotes omitted)); Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances
Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: An End to the Battle of the Forms,
supra note 6, at 541 n.5 (listing cases where rule is not applied, but asserting that these are
"of course" in the minority).
The commentators have not recognized that when all these exceptions are taken together,
much of the bite of the mirror-image rule is lost. One suspects that in its rigid form, the
mirror-image rule existed only in the treatises and hornbooks. One can doubt whether it
even took firm hold in New York after Poet. See, e.g., Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., 223
N.Y. 334, 338-40, 119 N.E. 552, 553 (1918) (exercise of an option to renew lease "complete
and absolute" despite request for acknowledgment). A closer examination of the lists of
mirror-image cases that Williston and Corbin provide in their treatises shows that cases in
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to escape from a deal by pointing to discrepancies between offer
and acceptance, common-law courts usually were unsympathetic.
They often asserted that a purported acceptance became a counteroffer only if differences between it and the offer were "substantial. 14 7 They were quick to cite the rule of "de minimis non curat
lex" and other maxims and equitable principles if the party seeking to avoid contractual obligations complained of the discrepancy
only to escape from a bad bargain, 48 especially if the party first
complained after litigation had already arisen. The courts could
also assert that different terms in the acceptance were implicit in
the offer anyway because of trade usage or the particular circumstances of the transaction. 49 Finally, courts could characterize dis-

which a trivial term was used successfully to welsh on deals were rare. Even in these cases,
the contract in question often is not typical of those ordinarily used in the trade.
47 See, e.g., Propstra v. Dyer, 189 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1951) (where offer gave delivery
as "latter part of September or early October" it would be "highly artificial" to construe an
answer of "October sellers option" as a counteroffer); Newspaper Readers Serv., Inc. v. Canonsburg Pottery Co., 146 F.2d 963, 965 (3d Cir. 1945) (discrepancy as to what date delivery
would start and whether some pieces would be sent early for advertising purposes not so
material as to preclude finding a contract); Glickstein & Terner, Inc. v. Sheffield Glass Bottle Co., 214 A.D. 626, 627, 212 N.Y.S. 444, 445 (1925) ("mild doubt" in acceptance that seller
would not make shipments on dates specified did not affect validity of acceptance);
Barteldes Seed Co. v. Fox, 134 Okla. 248, 250, 273 P. 258, 260 (1928) (acceptance of order
for two types of seed where buyer actually ordered only one binding for the one agreed
upon; acceptance not made conditional because immaterial words added); Kaw City Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Purcell Mill & Elevator Co., 19 Okla. 357, 358, 91 P. 1022, 1023 (1907) (contract formed through exchange of telegrams though buyer and seller differed on the city
from which freight would be charged).
11 See, e.g., A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 235-36 (1925) (after
price of sugar dropped, buyer asserted no contract existed; court deemed one difference a
"quibble," and harmonized the others: "Not until this action was brought was a variance
suggested. In such circumstances a court should be solicitous to find, as the parties evidently did before they became hostile, an accord between the two instruments."); Washington Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Norry Elec. Corp., 193 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1951) (buyer's acceptance of a contract for diesel generators required balance to be paid before shipment by
common carrier; offer had stated balance in two weeks, shipment by truck; objections over
differing terms held apparent afterthoughts); Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 9 F.2d 809, 813-14 (1st Cir. 1925) (acceptance added payment terms and delivery
option, and deleted some phrases in offer; court found no material difference, citing Small);
Shane Bros. & Wilson Co. v. Striglos, 228 Ill. App. 397, 401 (1923) (clause making acceptance subject to delay because of strikes did not make the acceptance conditional and thus a
counteroffer, because defendant had made no objection and treated the agreement as settled.); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Emerman, 191 Ill.
App. 530, 534-35 (1915) (contract formed
though acceptance added that delivery must be in box cars).
'9 See, e.g., Northern Produce Exch. v. Ablon, 169 Ill. App. 633, 637-38 (1912) (addition of
inspection term was custom of trade, so did not prevent formation of contract); Brown v.
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crepancies in the responsive document as "a request for a change
or addition" that did not prevent the document from being an
acceptance.5"
When courts used the mirror-image rule to hold that a contract
did not exist, the results rarely seemed arbitrary. For example, the
exchange of documents might have left significant terms unsettled,
such as the delivery date for goods in a volatile market.51 Courts
were unwilling to speculate whether parties would have come to
terms, had they had the chance to dicker over their differences.
Yet this unwillingness to speculate is very different from the rigid
posture of which the courts frequently have been accused.52
Norton, 2 N.Y.S. 869, 870-71 (Sup. Ct. 1888) (seller's acceptance, promising to deliver 24,000
blue Welsh firebricks provided that site of delivery would be nearby dock; held, no addition
to the contract, because goods were arriving from overseas so that it was implicit that they
would arrive on dock); Calumet Ref. Co. v. Star Lubricating Co., 64 Utah 358, 362, 230 P.
1028, 1029 (1924) (addition of payment terms not considered a conditional acceptance, because terms were customary in the trade). One should note, however, that these cases and
many other common-law cases, like their modern counterparts, are imperfect authorities,
because few are classic battle of the forms disputes in the sense in which that term is used
today. See supra note 8.
"oWilliston noted that "[firequently an offeree while making a positive acceptance of the
offer, adds as a request or suggestion that some addition or modification be made. So long
as it is clear that the meaning of the acceptance is positively and unequivocally to accept
the offer whether such request is granted or not, a contract is formed." 1 S. Williston, supra
note 42, § 79, at 138 (footnote omitted). Courts took advantage of this freedom to characterize a discrepancy between documents as a "proposal."
51 See, e.g., El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 IM. 494, 503, 127 N.E. 642,
645-46 (1920). Like many other cases cited as examples of the mirror-image rule, this case
may have been decided on alternate grounds.
61 Critics rely too much on Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110
N.E. 619 (1915). The decision is altogether exceptional in its rigid application of the mirrorimage rule and, in any event, is not so clearly wrong as almost all have readily concluded.
The buyer in Poel had corresponded with the seller for shipment of 12 tons of "Upriver Fine
Para Rubber" and filled in a preprinted form with the price and delivery terms the seller
had quoted. The form, aside from blanks for the order, stated only the following:
CONDITIONS ON WHICH ABOVE ORDER IS GIVEN
Goods on this order must be delivered when specified. In case you cannot comply,
advise us by return mail stating earliest date of delivery you can make, and await our
further orders.
The acceptance of this order which in any event you must promptly acknowledge
will be considered by us as a guaranty on your part of prompt delivery within the
specified time.
Terms: F.O.B.
Id. at 316-17, 110 N.E. at 621. The court concluded that the buyer had made its acceptance
of the deal conditional on seller's acknowledgment of its document and was therefore postponing the moment the contract arose until the seller complied with the condition. It was as
if the buyer had said, "Until you acknowledge this document, there is no deal." Id. at 319,
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Even assuming that some legislation was needed to prevent
courts from deciding contract disputes too inflexibly, however, a
statute as complex and troublesome as 2-207 was entirely unnecessary. To keep a welsher from using a technicality to renege on a
deal, a statute could have said:
An expression of definitive acceptance in substance, accompanied
by additional terms, shall be construed, in case of doubt, as constia modification
tuting an acceptance accompanied by an offer of
53
which the other party is free to accept or reject.

This provision, taken from a draft of the Revised Uniform Sales
Act (RUSA) written in the early 1940's, would have made it easier
for a court to reject a merely technical challenge to the existence of
a contract.5 4 Although the phrase "definitive acceptance in substance" invites some flexible judicial construction, the provision is
still a relatively straightforward formal rule that leaves the common-law rigors of contract formation intact. The document that
the court finds to be the offer forms the touchstone for determin110 N.E. at 621-22. In defense of the decision, one can argue that the buyer did not think
the prompt acknowledgment of its order a mere technicality, because the tenor of the
preprinted language is that the seller must bear the risk of the goods being delayed. If the
seller had acknowledged this document and the shipment had been delayed, the buyer
might have asserted a right to collect damages more easily than it could have if the document had lacked this language.
In any event, the conventional view is that 2-207 was essentially designed to reverse Poet.
See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 25. See also Rev. Unif. Sales Act §
20 comment 1 (Mimeo Draft Feb. 1948). One of the ironies of 2-207 is that it is not clear
that it would have produced a different result in the Poet case. Given the court's interpretation of the document, the correctness of the decision under 2-207 turns on the credence
given to expressly conditional language. Whether any expressly conditional language prevents a contract from being formed, regardless of how visible it is to the ordinary reader, is a
question left open to a court interpreting 2-207(1). Dean Murray implies that expressly conditional language is ineffective unless conspicuous. Murray, supra note 4, at 637-38. Although most courts now would probably refuse to treat the language in Poet as "expressly
conditional," some have given effect to other expressly conditional language appearing in
fine print. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.
1977). Moreover, the artificiality of the result in Poet stems not only from the mirror-image
rule, but also from the court's belief that it had to find all the relevant terms of the bargain
in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. 216 N.Y. at 324, 110 N.E. at 623. The Code's
statute of frauds, contained in section 2-201, might itself have made Poet a different case.
3 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform Sales
Act: Report and Second Draft, Alt. § 3-H (2d Draft 1941).
54 This article does not assert that this RUSA section was a particularly good rule. Had it
been enacted, the courts might have discovered almost as many ambiguities in it as they
have found in 2-207.

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 1236 1982

Battle of the Forms

1982]

1237

ing the substance of the promises that the parties exchanged. Differences over such matters as warranty provisions prevent an acknowledgment from being an acceptance, even if such differences
55
are buried in fine print that no one reads.
Thus, the goal of correcting the excesses of the common-law
courts in applying the mirror-image rule does not satisfactorily explain the creation of 2-207. Section 2-207 may have been designed
for a bolder purpose than simply overturning a common-law rule
whose flaws now appear largely academic. The drafters may have
intended not simply to replace a particular rule, but to change the
fundamental instruments of the law of contract formation from
rules to standards.
II.
A.

2-207 As

RULE AND STANDARD

The Approach of the Drafters

The chief innovation of 2-207 is not its change in the mirrorimage rule, but its abandonment of the very principle of a formal
rule of offer and acceptance. In place of a formal rule, the section
substitutes a general standard under which the court is to look to
the gist of the parties' communications to determine if they have
formed a contract. In so doing, the court is to overlook any express
terms in those communications that do not fairly reflect the parties' agreement.
The drafters carried out this innovation by a deceptively simple
analogy. They appear to have intended in 2-207 to treat the battle
of the forms in the same way that they treated an exchange of
forms in which certain elements of the contract are left unaddressed by the parties. In this latter instance, the buyer sends a
purchase order requesting ten units of a certain product; although
the seller's acknowledgment agrees to send the ten units, neither
party mentions the price of the goods or the time of delivery. The
Code's solution to this problem, contained in section 2-204(3), is a
good example of a statutory standard, as opposed to a rule:
as The comment to the section notes that "[w]here terms are changed in a purported
acceptance, the absence of agreement is patent. But where further terms are suggested, and
especially where such terms go to arrangements for facilitating performance, the better caselaw has tended strongly to read them according to the section." National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 53, Alt. § 3-H comment.
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Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make
a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."

If 2-204(3) applies, the court will supply the missing terms by referring to certain "off-the-rack" terms of the Code, which themselves are generally open-ended standards rather than rules,57 or
by referring to the custom and usage of the parties or their trade.5 8
Thus, under 2-204(3), the incompleteness of the exchanged forms
is no bar to finding a bargain. The essential innovation of the
drafters of 2-207 is to treat documents that conflict over terms of
the bargain in the same way that they treat documents that are
silent on essential terms.
A brief look at 2-207 demonstrates this change. Subsection (1) at
first may not seem to be a great departure from the original RUSA
provision on offer and acceptance. Nonetheless, the reference to
5- U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978).
At common law, parties were not allowed to leave essential details, such as price, unresolved. The Code removes this obstacle when a reasonable means of supplying the missing
terms exists. Id. The virtue of this rule is that it frees parties from the burden of negotiating
all of the details of their transaction. Normally, parties can resolve the details they initially
leave unsettled as the need arises. The cases in which they cannot are sufficiently rare that
parties are willing to accept the risk that they may have to litigate. That the parties do not
find it in their interest to settle all details at the start is itself a powerful reason for not
forcing them to do so. Commercial parties can fend for themselves. Nevertheless, the rule
allows parties to shift the costs of settling the terms of their contract to the courts.
Whether the incentives that off-the-rack rules give to parties to avoid negotiation, when it
would be cheaper for them to settle on terms in advance, are sufficient to justify limiting
their use is beyond the scope of this paper. The benefits of off-the-rack terms, however, still
could be retained without creating disincentives to negotiation, if parties to litigation fully
bore the costs of going to court or if off-the-rack rules were clear enough so that no party
would have an incentive to litigate.
57 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (1978) (price to be a "reasonable price" where not specifically established by contract); id. § 2-309(1) (requiring that "[t]he time for shipment or
delivery or any other action under a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon
shall be a reasonable time"). Another off-the-rack term, the implied warranty of
merchantability, may appear to be a "rule," because it is automatically inferred by law
where the seller is a merchant of goods of the kind sold. Id. § 2-314(1). Yet the substantive
content of the warranty in a particular case is determined under extremely general "standard" language. See id. § 2-314(2). The Code, in effect, also contains an off-the-rack "rule"
rejecting arbitration provisions simply because it never provides for them. A court could
nevertheless infer an arbitration clause from the customs and usage of the trade or from the
parties' course of dealing. Id. § 1-205. Cf. id. § 2-208.
58Id. § 1-205 (course of dealing and usage of trade). Cf. id. § 2-208 (course of performance
or practical construction).
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"different" as well as "additional" terms is vital. In contrast to
pre-Code law, it is not necessary under 2-207 for the parties to
speak in relative harmony in order to form a contract. Equally important is the provision in subsection (2) that, between merchants,
"immaterial" additions in the acknowledgment become part of the
contract unless the other party objects. The obvious inference is
that a "material" addition, though it does not become part of the
contract, nevertheless does not prevent a contract from being
formed. This provision marks a dramatic change from traditional
rules of offer and acceptance. Nothing in the earlier RUSA rule on
offer and acceptance suggested that additional terms in an acknowledgment could do anything more than propose to fine-tune
an offer, if the acknowledgment was to remain an acceptance. The
additional term could suggest a delivery date if the offer was vague
or silent on that point, but the additional term could not materiof warranties for inally alter the offer, by adding a disclaimer
59
stance, without destroying the agreement.
The drafters decided that, when parties communicate with documents after dickering explicitly over some terms and relegating
others to fine print, the court can act essentially as it does in the
case of harmonious but incomplete documents: it can find a contract and invoke an open-ended provision of the Code or the customs and usage of the parties or trade to supply the terms on
which the parties failed to agree. As Professor Hawkland suggests,
The approach of the Code in section 2-207, in effect, is to say:
"The parties have entered into a deal; they have made a contract
of sorts, and we will try to make a fair contract out of it." Maybe,
in doing this, terms are imposed on the parties that they do not
really like, but, on balance, a better result is achieved doing this
than would be achieved if the whole thing were thrown out the
window. 0
Neither Hawkland nor other commentators have squarely recognized, however, that the Code's approach only approximates the
parties' intent. The commentators therefore fail to appreciate fully
the boldness of this approach. In battles of the forms, one has no
way of knowing if the parties have in fact intended to enter into a
15Such a disclaimer, of course, would not destroy the agreement if the court finds that
the term is in fact a proposal for a change.
"Hawkland, supra note 6, at 85.
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binding contract regardless of any asymmetry in particular terms.
It is not only difficult to gather the facts needed to determine
whether the parties intended to contract; it is impossible, because
by the very nature of battles of the forms the parties never reflected whether they were legally bound despite differences in
terms. Indeed, the premise of a battle of the forms is that the parties are not aware that the terms conflict until a dispute arises, and
the dispute may not arise until well after performance.
B. 2-207 as a Rule for Confirmations
The Code's imperfect analogy between cases involving missing
terms and those involving a battle of the forms illuminates the
most troublesome question about 2-207. If the draftsmen wanted
to treat battles of the forms in the same way that they treated
exchanges of harmonious but incomplete documents, they might
simply have relied on 2-207(1) and 2-207(3). Why did they introduce the difficulties of 2-207(2) when, as a result, the final text of
2-207 captures the draftsmen's general goal only very inartfully?
Though 2-207 covers the first kind of battle of the forms rather
straightforwardly, its infamous subsection (2) presents serious
problems in resolving disputes of the second kind. The problems,
amply noted by the commentators, are several: Why does 2-207 address only the problem of "additional terms"? Are "different"
terms meant to be included under the aegis of "additional terms"?
Although comment 3 suggests that subsection (2) covers different
as well as additional terms, the drafting history of 2-207 provides
contrary evidence in that the word "different" was at one time inserted into subsection (2) and later dropped."1 Yet even the answer
61Whether the drafters intended "different" terms to be treated like "additional" terms
in subsection (2) is unclear. In a May 1951 meeting discussing the Proposed Final Draft No.
2, it was proposed that "different" be added to both subsection (1) and subsection (2). The
motion carried. See Transcript of Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute in Joint Session with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 27-28 (May 16-18, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Transcript]. Karl Llewellyn added the
words "or different" after "additional" in subsection (2) in the copy of the Code he used at
the meeting and noted that the change had been adopted. The Karl Llewellyn Papers,
J.XIII.1.a (available in University of Chicago Law School Library). The same amendment
appeared in American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, U.C.C., May Meeting Revisions to Proposed Final Draft No. 2, at 6 (June 1951).
However, the November 1951 Final Text Edition and the 1952 Official Draft did not include
this alteration to subsection (2).
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to this question does not explain how "different" terms should be
treated. If they are part of subsection (2), are different terms always "material" and therefore merely proposals for modifying the
contract? If subsection (2) is silent on the treatment of different
terms, what part of 2-207 or what other section of the Code does
one turn to? Do the different terms simply drop out and the offeror's terms govern? Or may courts resort to the gap-filler provisions of the Code for the term on which the documents of the par62
ties differ?

Llewellyn's initial response to the proposal that "different" be added to both subsections
(1) and (2) may suggest what led to the decision to drop "different" in subsection (2) after it
had been adopted:
My trouble with the "or different from" proposition is that I had construed subsection (2) as meaning that when you attempted to put in terms at odds with those that
the other party had already said it wanted, you had a notification in advance of objections to the terms you were trying to put in.
Transcript, supra, at 27. Llewellyn seems to suggest that "different" terms could never become part of the contract, even if they were nonmaterial, because of subsection 2(a). The
word "different" would thus be redundant. Llewellyn withdrew his objection after Soia
Mentschikoff made the following observation:
As I read sub (2) with the addition of the language, the additional or different terms
are to be construed as proposals for addition unless notification of objection to them
is given within a reasonable time. Well, if the seller has sent a form which says four
days [as the amount of time allowed for inspection] and the buyer sends a form which
says ten days, it is perfectly clear to me that each of them is objecting to the term
period indicated by the other, and therefore after [sic] that term, you have no agreement. But Mr. Buerger's basic point, that nonetheless you have a contract and that
the battle of forms gets resolved on what is the essential nature of the contract, which
is the agreement to buy or sell the quantity of goods at the price indicated at the time
to be delivered, means that the contract remains. I do not think the worries that
beset Mr. Llewellyn are real as to that.
Id. at 28. Mentschikoff's remarks, however, only argue for including "different" in subsection (1), not for including them in subsection (2), in which they would be "proposals." She
seems to suggest that when there is no agreement on a particular term, neither party's term
controls. It is possible that the drafters recognized this between the May meeting and the
November draft and took "different" out of subsection (2) for this reason. If this is true, offthe-rack terms should govern whenever there are different terms.
" This is the approach advocated by Professor White (though rejected by Professor Summers). See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 28-30. The approach was adopted
by the court in Lea Ta Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See also Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Mach. Co., 65 Mich. App. 426, 428-29,
237 N.W.2d 488, 489 (1975) (following this approach, but appearing to rely on subsection
(3), which by its terms does not apply when the forms create a contract under subsection
(1)). This argument may have been rejected in Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1979). Two other courts have held that "different" terms
are to be treated like "additional" terms. See Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616
S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 102-03 n.5,
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More fundamentally, when is an "additional" term not a "different" term? 63 When parties reach an explicit agreement, but leave
some terms unsettled, the Code supplies the missing terms. An offer includes not only the terms it addresses explicitly, but also the
off-the-rack terms that the Code supplies to fill in any gaps. An
unequivocal acceptance of such an offer is an acceptance of both
explicit and implicit terms. A term in an "expression of acceptance" might simply repeat a term implicit in the offer because of
the off-the-rack term the Code supplies.6 But when is a term that
is not redundant in this way anything other than a "different,"
rather than an "additional" term? 5 Any term that does not repeat
what was implicit or explicit in the offer appears to depart from
the offer, rather than supplement it, and therefore seems to be a
"different" term.6 6 Finally, what is an "immaterial" addition?
When is it anything more than a term that the Code would supply
and is therefore already implicit in the offer-and therefore,
strictly speaking, not "additional" at all?
Although some of these difficulties may have been inadvertent,
and no specific expression of legislative intent may exist to resolve
them, we can better understand their source if we view them in
light of the dual function of 2-207 and the distinction between
standards and rules. For reasons that remain obscure,67 the drafters wanted to make a single statutory provision work for both contract formation and contract confirmation.6 8 They created a chan-

569 P.2d 751, 759 n.5, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 165 n.5 (1977). But see supra note 61.
'3 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 211-12, 206
N.W.2d 414, 423-24 (1973). The difficulty of distinguishing "additional" and "different" i
addressed in 3 R. Duesenberg & L. King, supra note 6, § 3.0311].
" For example, when a seller's form makes no mention of warranty, the buyer might have
a clause in its form that seller warrants the goods to be merchantable. This clause is in some
sense an "additional" term. Yet it does not "add" anything to the bargain because, in the
absence of any mention by the parties, the Code assumes that the seller warrants its goods
as merchantable. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978).
" For example, a seller frequently tries to disclaim the implied warranties of
merchantability. See, e.g., Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d at 207, 206
N.W. 2d at 421. These disclaimers would seem to be "different" ratber than "additional"
terms.
11 See 3 R. Duesenberg & L. King, supra note 6, § 3.03[1].
17 See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 35.
11 See U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1 (1978). For a thorough discussion of how courts should
apply 2-207 to confirmation cases, see Murray, supra note 4, at 614-18 n.56.
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neling rule appropriate to confirmations and then grafted that rule
onto the 2-207 standard for the battle of the forms.
In an earlier effort, the drafters of RUSA had recognized the frequently excessive costs that parties face in fine-tuning an oral
agreement through writing. The parties may not care greatly
whether delivery is to be in 90 or 105 days, but they nevertheless
wish to settle the matter in advance. Similarly, it may not matter
very much which party insures the goods while they are in transit,
but it does matter that the question be settled before performance.
The drafters of RUSA had recognized, however, that the cost of
fine-tuning the agreement over such matters in writing was often
very high. RUSA therefore contained a purportedly straightforward rule which is an example of a channeling rule that aims at
resolving such matters through a single confirming letter. The rule
simply stated that the terms in the confirming letter sent by either
party are binding, unless the terms effect any material change in
the oral agreement, or the party receiving the letter makes a timely
69
objection.
In later versions of RUSA, the drafters combined this section on
confirming letters with the section altering the mirror-image rule
to produce a direct forebear of 2-207:
Where either a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or
a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
"

The relevant section reads in full:
Alternative Section 3-I. Confirmations Containing New Terms. (new to Sales Act)
(1) This section applies between merchants where a contract has been concluded
orally or by wire, and a letter of confirmation contains additional language proposed

for inclusion in the agreement, or treated in the letter as being included.
(2) In the absence of express objection by the other party within a reasonable time
after his receipt of the letter, the additional language shall be construed as included
in the agreement if it satisfies the following conditions(a) If it is of a character reasonably connected with the agreement; and
(b) If it does not unreasonably depart from the provisions of law which would otherwise govern; and
(c) If it does not negate or unduly modify the particularized terms of the agreement
as made; and
(d) If it is so placed and printed as reasonably to force attention from the
addressee.
(3) If there is express objection by the addressee within a reasonable time, or if the
language does not meet the requirements laid down in subsection 2, the original contract stands as made, and the additional language operates only as an offer to modify
it.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 53, Alt. § 3-I.
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states terms additional to those offered or agreed upon
(a) the additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
modification or addition; and
(b) between merchants the additional terms become part of the
contract unless they materially alter it or notice of objection
to them is given within a reasonable time after they are
70
received.
Thus, subsection (2) of 2-207 is a relic of a channeling rule created
not for battles of the forms, but for confirming letters.
Some of the problems in applying 2-207(2) to battles of the
forms result from a flaw inherent in this channeling rule. In trying
to ensure that the rule did not allow a party sending a document to
take unfair advantage of the party receiving it, the drafters introduced troublesome unpredictability into a rule for which predictability was essential: in every case the question turns on whether a
particular term is "material." The channeling rule the drafters created for confirming letters is supposed to give the party receiving
the document an incentive to read it, by putting him on notice
that, unless he objects, he will be bound by its terms. The more
broadly the meaning of "material" is defined, however, the less the
chance that the recipient will be bound, and therefore the less the
incentive for the recipient to read the document.
Regardless of the inherent virtues or vices of the channeling rule,
its use in the battle of the forms context is unfortunate..Theoretically at least, the rule contradicts the standard that the drafters of
2-207 intended for battle of the forms cases-that conflicting
forms be treated like consistent but incomplete documents. Having
declared in subsection (1) that conflicts or asymmetries in the fine
print of the two forms do not alone preclude the finding of a contract, 2-207 rather arbitrarily imposes the fine-print term of one of
the parties on the other, at least where the failure of agreement
lies in an additional rather than a different term. The language of
the section therefore continues to dignify the sort of legal formality
that presumably had been the bane of the common law. The difference is that where the mirror-image rule imposed the terms of the
last document, 2-207 imposes the terms of the first. In addition,
the section's reference to expressly conditional language appears to
70 American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Code of Commercial Law, art. II, § 20 (1948) (Revised Uniform Sales Act).
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allow parties to opt out of the present rule altogether on the basis
of yet another fine-print term.1
Although 2-207 addresses the major flaw that has been perceived
in the mirror-image rule-the ability of welshers to use fine-print
terms to escape a contract-it does not satisfactorily address the
problem of determining which fine-print terms govern a transaction once a court finds that the forms do indeed create a contract.
If the statute is to treat exchanges of conflicting documents and
exchanges of harmonious but incomplete documents in the same
way, one would expect the fine-print terms to cancel each other
out. Before concluding that 2-207 must be revised to carry out the
drafters intended rejection of the formal rule approach, however,
one must examine how the courts have interpreted the section.
C.

The Approach of the Courts

In the first type of battle of the forms-the case in which a dispute arises before performance as to whether a contract exists at
all-the success of 2-207 is readily apparent. Courts might have
interpreted 2-207(1) so as to preserve common-law notions of offer
and acceptance, thus inviting frequent litigation over the meaning
of an "expressly conditional" acknowledgment. For example,
courts might have held that differences over warranty, price, or
quantity are so inherently substantial that their existence, even in
fine print, prevents an acknowledgment from being an "expression
of acceptance." By and large, however, courts have followed the
intent of the drafters and have found binding contracts whenever
conflicting terms are stated in part of the preprinted language that
was not the subject of prior dickering.72 In the first type of the
battle of the forms, then, 2-207 has been successful both in the
sense that it has reduced litigation and in the sense that the courts
have faithfully followed the drafters' intent to replace a commonlaw rule with a statutory standard.
With respect to the second type of dispute in battle of the forms
cases-disputes over which contract terms are to control following
performance-the judicial success of 2-207 is less clear. In subsection (2), the courts have had to grapple with a channeling rule

71
71

See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.

See supra note 1.
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flawed in itself-because it lacks the formal certainty that is the
very purpose of a rule-and in any event misapplied to battles of
the forms. Yet the remarkable thing is that the courts, using their
ability to bend troublesome statutory language to fit commercial
reality, have managed to apply 2-207 in a manner substantially
faithful to the drafters' essential purpose.
Although litigation over the meaning of "material" has been frequent, such litigation takes a predictable course. Courts nearly always find clauses in the acknowledgment form to be "material,"
unless those clailses would be read into the contract in any event
because of trade usage or course of dealing.7 3 Courts appear to find
"material" any clause worth litigating. In time, one would expect
litigation to decrease, as the likely outcome of litigation becomes
clear.
From the face of subsection (2), the result of a finding of materiality seems to be that the terms in the offeror's form govern the
transaction. Thus, it appears that 2-207 has substituted a first-shot
rule for the common law's last-shot rule. As we noted above, such
an approach is inconsistent with the idea that battles of the forms
should be treated like cases in which parties have agreed in principle to do business with one another, but have remained silent as to
some of the terms of the transaction.
An examination of court decisions under 2-207, however, does
not compel the conclusion that the section has, in practice, created
a first-shot rule. The striking aspect of this litigation to date has

73 See supra note 2. Materiality is often left as a question of fact. Yet the courts have
established some guidelines. For example, there has been extensive litigation in New York
on the materiality of particular arbitration clauses, but recently the New York Court of
Appeals suggested that all arbitration clauses are material. See Marlene Indus. Corp. v.
Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 334, 380 N.E.2d 239, 242, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 414 (1978).
A later case, however, suggested that despite Marlene, an arbitration clause might be nonmaterial if it were part of the usage of trade. See Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 49
N.Y.2d 1, 5-6, 399 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56, 424 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (1979). One early case suggested that a warranty disclaimer might be nonmaterial. See J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Singer Co.,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 110, 111 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). Nonetheless, recent cases
have held otherwise. See, e.g., Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 528
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Terms that might at first glance appear material usually enter the
contract because of a prior course of dealing or usage of trade. See, e.g., Oskey Gasoline &
Oil Co. v. OKC Ref. Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Minn. 1973) (buyer adds handwritten term
that amount of gasoline delivered be measured in terms of "gross gallonage," which was
about 2% more than the alternative "net gallonage" measure; former measure held adopted
by the parties through trade usage and prior dealing).
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been that the terms that bind the parties are usually held to be
those that the Code would have supplied had the parties' forms
been completely silent. In effect, then, the courts resolve battle of
the forms cases with the Code's off-the-rack terms rather than
with a first-shot rule. The statute's apparent first-shot language
permits this result in two ways. First, when parties insert clauses
that condition an offer or a purported acceptance on agreement to
the terms of the offer or acceptance, a court finding such language
to be "expressly conditional" can supply the Code's off-the-rack
terms under the aegis of subsection (3).74 Second, even when
neither form is expressly conditional, the first form is typically
that of a buyer who sends a purchase order. 5 Buyers most often
insert into their forms only terms that the Code would provide in
any event. In the absence of any explicit agreement, the Code gives
the buyer an implied warranty of merchantability and holds the
seller liable for consequential damages.78 Sellers rather than buyers
usually seek arbitration. In such cases, it generally makes no practical difference whether the buyer's terms or the Code's off-therack terms control.
A few cases do arise in which the original offeror includes terms
that depart from the Code's off-the-rack rules. In practice even
these terms may not become part of the contract; thus we have
further evidence that 2-207 has not produced a first-shot rule. In
most of these cases, the term that departs from the Code-a disclaimer of warranty, for example-conflicts with one in the other
party's form. Thus, a court confronts "different" terms. Two
courts that addressed this question took advantage of the ambiguities in 2-207's language and did not impose the buyer's fine-print
terms on the seller.7 One court reasoned that section 2-207 is silent on the treatment of terms when the parties' forms conflict,
71 See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d at 1235-37; Scott Brass,
Inc. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 473 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (D.R.I. 1979).
7' An exception is Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 468-70, 540
P.2d 978, 981 (1975), in which seller's form was the first shot and contained limitations on
warranty and damage liability.
71 For example, the warranty provisions in the buyer's form controlled in Rite Fabrics,
Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), but the result would likely have
been the same under the Code's implied warranties, see U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1978).
7 Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404, 1406-07 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Mach. Co., 65 Mich. App. at 429-30, 237
N.W.2d at 489-90. See supra note 62.
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because subsection (2) by its terms applies to additional terms
only. The court therefore looked outside the section and held that
78
it could turn to the Code's policy of supplying off-the-rack terms.
If this treatment of "different" terms continues, few cases will ever
arise in which the terms imposed on the parties under 2-207 will
differ from those that would be imposed if 2-207 is redrafted to
include an express standard that cancels out fine-print terms on
which the parties failed to agree and that supplies in their stead
the Code's gap-fillers.
In short, 2-207 has not worked badly in practice. Although the
channeling rule in subsection (2) has spawned unnecessary litigation, even these cases have been decided consistently, for the most
part. The majority of courts applying 2-207 to battle of the forms
cases have found enforceable contracts when forms differed only in
nondickered, fine-print terms. The terms of the contract, however
derived, are usually the same as those the Code would have supplied had the parties left the matter completely unsettled. Thus,
whether 2-207 is a badly drafted statute is not of great concern,
because courts have used it for nearly three decades in a manner
consistent with the principles on which it rests. The more interesting question is whether these principles are themselves sound.

III.

THE COSTS OF RULES AND STANDARDS

The previous section of this article attempted to demonstrate
that 2-207 effectively replaces an old formal rule with a new legal
standard for resolving battle of the forms disputes. To say that 2207 takes the "standard" approach, however, is not to endorse that
approach. As we have emphasized, both standards and rules have
their costs. In choosing an approach for a particular kind of dispute, one should ask whether the costs of one approach are more
tolerable than those of the approach it is to replace. In this remaining section, we attempt to show that the standard approach
itself has significant costs and that the problems attributed to the
mirror-image rule have been greatly exaggerated.79
Lea Tai Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. at 1407.
Neither choice entails making any distinct social group of contracting parties better or
worse off than another. Parties who battle with forms are merchants, and merchants are
necessarily both buyers and sellers. A battle of the forms rule that favored buyers (or sellers) would seem to benefit most merchants only as much as it hurts them. An exception
78
79
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The Costs of 2-207

The Code's "standard" approach does have notable virtues."0
The approach does not create incentives for parties to bargain over
contract terms8 1 whose benefits are smaller than the cost of negotiating them. Perhaps parties that exchange conflicting forms could
easily resolve differences in nondickered terms, if negotiation costs
were low enough. Indeed, the Code's off-the-rack terms may give
parties the terms they would have settled on if they had negotiated
over them. A standard based on the principles of 2-207 may give
parties to some transactions what they would have gotten had they
spent more time and money bargaining. The standard, therefore,
allows these parties to get the terms they want without the costs
associated with establishing them through negotiations.
It is crucial to realize, however, that the Code's off-the-rack
terms fit some parties and some transactions better than others,
and that parties suffer when off-the-rack terms are imposed that
are not in their interest. Where an off-the-rack provision categorically prefers a buyer to a seller or a seller to a buyer, the court may
be unable to supply a term in the best interests of both parties.8 2
Where the off-the-rack provision works as an open-ended standard, the court may fail to exercise its discretion in the parties'

would be merchants who sell only to consumers. Their purchases, but not their sales, would
be subject to a battle of the forms rule. Yet here, as elsewhere, one would expect these
merchants to adjust their price terms, even if their sellers always won the battle of the
forms. These merchants do not seem as a group to have substantially more or less market
power than their sellers. Firms that sell to consumers come in all sizes, from Sears, Roebuck
to the mom-and-pop grocery store.
8oMany commentators also emphasize that using the Code's off-the-rack terms is inherently more "fair" than any rule favoring the terms in one document or the other. See, e.g., J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 6, § 1-2, at 31 (noting that "[a]t least [an off-the-rack
term] has the merit of being a term that the draftsmen considered fair"). Yet a rule that
favors one party or another is not necessarily "unfair." If the rule were clear-for example,
that the last form always won or that the buyer's form always won-and if the rule were
common knowledge, it could not be considered "unfair" in the sense that it defeated parties'
reasonable expectations. The sounder objection may be that clear but arbitrary rules are too
costly for parties to bargain around. As a result, parties are saddled with terms that do not
advance their self-interest.
SI Some commentators regret that parties do not bargain over all the details of their deal.
See, e.g., id. § 1-2, at 24 (noting that "[i]t is a sad fact that many sales contracts are not
fully bargained"). The Code, however, recognizes that requiring the parties to dicker over all
the details of a bargain is wasteful. See U.C.C. § 2-204 (1978). See also supra note 56.
"' See supra note 57.
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interests. 3
The following example illustrates this problem. A buyer needs a
glue to seal plastic bags that contain frozen vegetables. It finds a
seller who is willing to provide a certain type of glue for ninety-five
dollars, without any warranty. If the seller is liable for the glue's
possible failure, however, it would charge five dollars more. This
five dollars is for the extra precautions the seller would take. The
extra payment also covers the risk that, despite its efforts, one
batch of glue in a thousand will fall and cause thousands of dollars
worth of vegetables to perish.
The seller should not sell its glue with a warranty if the buyer is
better positioned to accept this risk. The buyer may be able to test
the glue more cheaply than the seller can. The buyer, after all,
knows the particular surfaces it wants the glue to bind, and the
seller may be a wholesaler that does not make the glue or have any
special knowledge about the glue's characteristics. The buyer may
have greater knowledge of the likelihood and consequences of glue
failing on frozen vegetable packages, and thus may be the cheaper
bearer of the risk. The total cost of the buyer's accepting the risk
of glue failure might be only three dollars instead of the five dollars for the seller. If this were the case, the buyer would prefer to
buy glue at ninety-five dollars and spend three dollars more to test
it and insure against unavoidable loss. This would be preferable to
buying the glue with a warranty from the seller for one hundred
dollars.
Both parties are worse off if the goods are sold with a warranty,
but the Code presumes that merchant sellers are better positioned
than buyers to bear the risk of their product failing." The seller
and buyer can negotiate out of this presumption, but such negotiations come at a cost. Indeed, as we have emphasized, a battle of
the forms only arises when these negotiation costs exceed the benefits to either party. Given such costs, the buyer and the seller may
be better off if seller sells the glue at one hundred dollars than if
they tried to negotiate a lower price for an "as is" sale. The buyer

83

See id.

U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). In this example, the Code's off-the-rack provision essentially
operates as a formal rule. In other cases, the off-the-rack provision may be a standard delegating broad discretion to the court, but the result will be the same if the court misperceives
the joint interests of the parties. See supra note 57.
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and seller will be better off living with the Code whenever the cost
of negotiating is greater than two dollars, which is the difference
between the cost of the glue to the buyer with a warranty (one
hundred dollars) and the cost without a warranty (ninety-eight
dollars). Of course, the possibility that the Code produces an inefficient result in this example does not mean that it always will. In
other transactions, the seller will be better able to absorb the risk
of goods failing than the buyer is, and the Code's off-the-rack provision will coincide with what the parties would have agreed to.
The point, however, is that off-the-rack provisions by nature fit
imperfectly; they are better tailored for some transactions than for
others. The cost of off-the-rack provisions is that they supply, or
allow courts to supply, inefficient terms in some cases. But many
who extoll the virtue of the Code for supplying terms whenever the
parties do not reach explicit agreement do not appreciate this cost.
The goal of a legal approach to the battle of the forms should be
two-fold. First, it should allow parties to avoid wasteful negotiations. Second, it should encourage contracts to include the most
efficient terms possible. For example, a sales contract should be
subject to a warranty if and only if it is cheaper for the seller than
the buyer to inspect the goods. An approach that forces the parties
to negotiate all the terms of the transaction would generally
achieve the second goal, but not the first. The flexible standard of
2-207, in contrast, allows parties to save negotiating costs, but at
the price of the Code's gap-filler provisions which, as we have seen,
may not happen to fit a particular transaction. If we can create a
set of rules that allows parties to minimize negotiating costs and
still get the right terms for their particular transaction we should
do so. In the following discussion we show how the mirror-image
rule, in theory, can achieve these goals better than a statute such
as 2-207, which is based on the flexible standard approach.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Returning to a Rule
Under the mirror-image rule, the fact that some parties will read
forms (or the relevant parts of them) can compel the party that
writes a form to include terms that take into account the special
skills and needs of buyers and sellers in a particular market. This
result militates against parties unilaterally favoring their own interests in form writing. The mirror-image rule, in particular, allows
and encourages parties to offer terms that advance both parties'
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interests, rather than risk the loss of business from those who buy
or sell goods with special concern for such matters as warranties
and arbitration provisions.
The mirror-image rule, unlike a standard that allows a court to
supply off-the-rack terms, permits parties to tailor terms to suit
their own circumstances. The major concern of this section is to
overcome the chief objection to the mirror-image rule-that it invites parties to insert terms that are simply unilaterally advantageous to themselves. Initially, however, we wish to address two
other objections: first, that the rule invites a prolonged battle of
the forms, and second, that the rule allows parties to welsh on
deals before performance.
One strong objection to a return to the mirror-image rule is that
it would encourage an endless battle of the forms. Because any
substantial difference between a seller's term and a buyer's makes
the responding document a counteroffer accepted by shipment or
acceptance of the goods, some fear that the parties will keep sending documents to each other in order to ensure that its own document arrives last. Such behavior, however, seems unlikely. If the
term involved is expected to be important relative to the entire
transaction, the parties can afford to dicker over it explicitly. In
addition, it is unlikely that the parties will engage in a prolonged
battle of the forms without reading each other's forms. Most businessmen, after all, have little interest in playing games with legal
rules. Even if the parties do consider a prolonged exchange of
forms, they will probably realize that by sending a new form they
lose the chance to do business on the terms in the other party's
form. No stratagem ensures that a particular party will be the last
to send a form, and an attempt to send the last form could backfire completely. A seller or buyer might simply decide not to do
business with a party that rigidly insisted on its own terms.
A second objection is that a return to the mirror-image rule
would create opportunities for parties to back out of the deal by
insisting that no contract had been formed, whenever they confront an unfavorable change in conditions between the exchange of
forms and performance. These fears, however, may be exaggerated.
Modern courts, like the pre-Code courts, could easily adopt a "de
minimis" exception to the mirror-image rule and hold that the exchange of documents creates a contract despite the failure of the
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documents to match each other on all terms.8 5 In situations in
which the court refuses to so hold-such as when the parties disagree over a warranty term-the absence of a binding contract may
simply be the risk that parties take when they use preprinted
forms containing self-interested terms.
Under the mirror-image rule, parties could limit this risk if they
wanted to. If, for example, it became clear that warranty disclaimers prevented a contract from being formed until the parties performed, sellers that wanted to ensure binding contracts could include disclaimers less frequently. The buyer for its part could bind
all of its sellers by routinely sending a form agreeing to all the
terms in the seller's form. In addition, the law could prevent long
periods in which no enforceable contract existed by a rule that
would allow courts to infer agreement on a contract from the silence of a party receiving a counteroffer. Depending on the length
of time permitted under the rule and on the form that it required
for rejection of the counteroffer, this rule could prove preferable to
2-207.
In any event, the problem of welshing is probably not a serious
one. Parties typically try to welsh on deals when the price of the
goods has changed significantly between contracting and performance. Dramatic price changes usually occur with commodities such
as wheat, oil, or cotton. But battle of the forms disputes that involve important contract terms in fine print, such as warranty disclaimers, typically involve manufactured goods, whose prices are
less susceptible to sudden change. 86
The major objection to a return to the mirror-image rule, however, is that one party-typically the buyer-is bound by the terms
of the other, even though that first party is wholly unaware of
those terms. This objection thus focuses on the response of the
mirror-image rule to the second battle of the forms problem. We
note first that the commercial concern underlying this objection
probably is exaggerated. The objection has strength only if buyers
typically are unaware of important preprinted terms when they
enter into contracts. Merchants, however, probably do look for,
and pay attention to, preprinted terms that may prove important
85 See

supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.

86 See Schwartz, Cure and Revocation for Quality Defects: The Utility of Bargains, 16
B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 543, 545-46 (1975).
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in the transaction, including terms, such as warranty disclaimers,
that turn up so frequently as the subjects of reported battle of the
forms litigation. As the discussion below explains, even if only a
minority of merchants pay attention to preprinted forms, the fears
underlying this last objection to the mirror-image rule are
unfounded.
We challenge the assumption that only the charity of the last
party to send a form (usually the seller) constrains it in setting
terms that the parties have not dickered over. This assumption
suggests that all sellers and all buyers will include unilaterally advantageous terms in their own preprinted forms, thus making
those forms as self-interested as possible regardless of the particular good being sold. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. If
sellers, for example, were inclined to act in such extreme apparent
self-interest, they certainly could do so under the Code. Although
they run the risk that their self-interested terms will directly conflict with those in the buyers' forms, the result of such a conflict
under section 2-207(3) would likely be reference to the Code's offthe-rack provisions; such sellers might be willing to take the
chance that they would win under those provisions. But sellers'
preprinted forms under the Code have not proved uniformly selfinterested. Even in the sale of consumer goods, where buyers have
little chance to dicker and little skill in bargaining, the disclaimers
of and limits on warranty obligations that sellers place in their
preprinted forms have varied widely among different products.8
Sellers do not invariably place all possible burdens on their buyers.
Under any legal rule or standard, merchants would find it impractical to make their preprinted forms completely self-inter17

The only recent empirical study of which the authors are aware was made in England,

where the mirror-image rule appears to survive. See supra note 10. That study suggests that
parties read at least the more important of the fine-print terms, such as warranty disclaimers. See Beale & Dugdale, supra note 5, at 50. Based on a survey of only 19 engineering
manufacturers, the study must be regarded as merely suggestive.
88 Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297, 1328-46
(1981). Priest espouses what he calls the investment theory of warranty. In this view, manufacturers will tend to warrant against defects that are cheaper for them to be responsible
for. Consumers will pay for warranties through higher prices. In contrast, manufacturers will
not warrant against defects that are cheaper for consumers to repair, live with or prevent
themselves. See id. at 1307-13. Alternative theories advocated by other writers are: (1) the
exploitation theory, which predicts that manufacturers will limit their legal obligations as
much as possible in their warranties, and (2) the signal theory, which maintains that warranty terms provide information about the product's reliability. See id. at 1299-1307.
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ested. When a party sends back an acknowledgment form, it never
knows whether the person receiving it will read the form or, at
least, the important parts in it, such as disclaimers. The party who
sends a form must recognize that some of those receiving it will
take their business elsewhere rather than accept the preprinted
terms or dicker over them. The seller must take account of these
lost sales to those who read forms, just as similarly situated buyers
must take account of lost purchasing opportunities. This group
that reads forms need not be especially large to place an effective
check on the other party. The expected gain from unilaterally advantageous form terms, even if they do not result in lost sales, may
be quite small relative to the profit on the whole transaction. If the
expected stakes involved in a particular term were large enough,
the parties would find it in their interest to dicker over them; these
terms would thus not appear in fine print at all. Moreover, if the
party that generally sent the last form did write forms with unilaterally advantageous terms, the other party could take account of
this fact by setting a lower price, thereby reducing the potential
gain from self-interested form terms. In contrast to this small potential gain, the amount that a seller or buyer has to lose, even if it
loses only a single sale or a single opportunity to buy, may be quite
large.
Thus, under any legal provision, including the mirror-image rule,
market forces reduce a merchant's ability to use wholly biased,
preprinted forms. Indeed, the mirror-image rule, compared to
other possible approaches, takes maximum advantage of these
market forces. It makes printed forms matter more by encouraging
or even forcing parties receiving documents to read them more
carefully. The rule thereby encourages parties sending documents
to make them attractive to their intended recipients.
A comparison with 2-207 illustrates this point. Even when
viewed as a first-shot rule that allows the first form to govern in
some battles of the forms, 2-207 does not greatly encourage parties
to put attractive terms into their preprinted forms. Under 2-207, a
party receiving a biased form is likely to respond with an acceptance conditional on assent to its own terms. The result will be reference to the Code's off-the-rack provisions under 2-207(3). Since
the sending party might win under these provisions, the unpredictability of many of which at least makes a biased form a reasonable
gamble, the sender may rightly perceive that it has little to lose
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from a biased form.
Even if the last party does not make its acceptance expressly
conditional, the presence of its own, different terms may still allow
a court to impose off-the-rack terms. Because no party can insist
on its own terms under 2-207, and because the terms a court will
supply are usually those of the Code in any event, 2-207 does not
give those who receive documents much of an incentive to read
them. A standard that allows a court to substitute general off-therack terms for fine print cannot at the same time give the parties
an incentive to draft forms in their mutual interest. The more the
off-the-rack terms control, the less the fine print matters, both to
the courts and to the parties themselves. The mirror-image rule, by
contrast, enables and encourages parties to adjust the terms in
their documents to the special skills and needs of buyers and sellers in their particular market, where the Code's off-the-rack provisions and the courts' application of them are not sensitive to the
characteristics of that market.
Section 2-207 thus encourages the seller to make his preprinted
forms self-interested, and to ignore special features of the transactions in which the forms will be used. Thus in the glue example,
the seller will probably include a warranty disclaimer in its forms,
regardless of which party could prevent defects in the adhesive
most cheaply. If the buyer's form consistently includes a broad
warranty provision, the seller might not win its disclaimer, because
the court may resort to the off-the-rack implied-warranty provision in 2-314. Nevertheless, the seller has little to lose by including
the disclaimer. The only danger it faces is that of offending the
buyer and losing the contract, but this danger is far smaller than it
would be under the mirror-image rule. The buyer of the glue, after
all, will probably ignore the disclaimer, anticipating that in case of
conflict the court will supply the 2-314 warranty. The seller, for its
part, might even hope to gain by its disclaimer, gambling that if
the court does supply the 2-314 warranty, it will also use its broad
discretion under 2-314(2) to qualify the warranty in the seller's
favor. In any event, the result will be unsatisfactory if 2-314 supplies a warranty where the mutual economic interests of the parties dictate otherwise.
Under the mirror-image rule, in contrast, the seller has a strong
incentive to moderate the warranty term in its form to reflect the
mutual interest of the parties in that type of transaction. The
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seller knows that if the buyer accepts the contract on the seller's
terms, its own form will govern, and so it retains a natural incentive to make the term favorable to itself. As the seller realizes,
however, the buyer also expects the seller's form to govern if it is
the last one in the battle; the buyer will be disinclined to accept
the contract on the terms in that document if those terms are too
biased in the seller's favor. The seller knows that at least some
buyers will be careful enough to read the seller's form8 9 and that, if
the form is too biased, these buyers will either take their business
elsewhere90 or at least respond with yet another document containing terms more in their own favor. Thus, the seller that does not
moderate its self-interest in drafting its forms will lose the opportunity to deal with at least some buyers on the terms in that form.
Its rational self-interest will therefore be to design the terms in its
form in the mutual interest of the parties.
Under the mirror-image rule, then, each party, in designing its
form for a particular type of transaction, has an incentive to hypothesize the terms that the parties would have settled upon had
they dickered over them. This process produces terms that are
more suitable for some transactions than are the Code's own gapfiller provisions. In the glue example, for instance, if the buyer is
the party that could prevent defects in the glue more cheaply, the
seller might include a disclaimer; on the other hand, if the seller is
better positioned to test for defects and such is common knowledge
in that market, the seller probably would include a warranty-or
at least not include a disclaimer. In transactions involving other
goods, where the parties would have split the responsibility for
preventing losses caused by defects had they dickered, the seller
might include a qualified warranty, such as one giving the buyer

" Although it is impossible to determine the minimum proportion of buyers who must
read the seller's form to constrain its terms, this proportion may be quite low. It depends on
many factors, including the seller's expected gain from the particular self-interested term,
how much the buyer expects to lose from doing business subject to that term, and how
much the buyer's purchase is worth to the seller. It is worth noting that the buyers who are
most likely to read fine-print terms may also be the seller's most valuable customers.
90 Of course, in some cases the buyer cannot take his business elsewhere because the seller
has a monopoly. In this case, it may be argued that the seller can impose unreasonable form
terms on .buyers. We note, however, that to the extent that a monopolist extracts his monopoly rent through unreasonable form terms, he may lose his ability to charge the full
monopoly price. Thus, even a seller with substantial market power has an incentive to produce a form with an optimum mix of price and terms.
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rights to replacement and repair but excluding consequential damages. In other cases, a seller may anticipate that arbitration would
be in the mutual interest of both buyer and seller. Even though the
Code does not supply an arbitration clause, the seller could supply
one and include the specific provisions-such as the way arbitrators are to be chosen-that the parties would have settled upon
had they negotiated such a term.
The mirror-image rule can work in this way to produce better
results than the Code's off-the-rack provisions, even where these
provisions are broad "reasonableness" standards rather than fixed
terms. In these cases, a court using 2-207 might not exercise its
discretion to supply a term that was appropriate to a particular
transaction. For example, if the buyer's form insists that the seller
is liable for any delay beyond the delivery date in the contract,
while the seller's form disclaims any such liability, a court might
look to section 2-309(1) of the Code. Under this provision, the
court might settle on some "reasonable" time at which the seller
would become liable. Because of the court's lack of familiarity with
the parties' businesses, that time might be earlier or later than the
parties would have agreed to had they had a cheap opportunity to
dicker. Under the mirror-image rule, the seller would have anticipated that dickered-on date and included it in its preprinted form,
balancing its desire to obtain the buyer's business against its desire
to limit its liability as much as possible.
The mirror-image rule will work in the manner described above
if two conditions are met. First, some minimum number of buyers
must be sensitive to terms in fine print. Second, the courts must be
willing and able to enforce the rule. If the rule works as described,
it will produce form terms that fit the needs of parties in particular markets better than the Code's off-the-rack provisions. Thus, if
these Code provisions depart significantly from merchants' interests in specific transactions, the rule will not merely be equal to an
approach based on the principles of 2-207, but superior.
It is quite plausible that the first condition will be met. Recent
commentary has suggested that fixed printed terms in sellers' warranties conform to buyers' preferences even in consumer transactions.9 1 If among consumers there are enough price-sensitive and
91 See Priest, supra note 88; Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 638 (1979)
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term-sensitive buyers to constrain the seller when the latter drafts
its forms, one would be surprised to find too few such buyers
among merchants, who presumably know more about what terms
are important and who, on the whole, are likely to have roughly
the same bargaining power as those with whom they contract.
The second condition is more troublesome. Perhaps the stubbornest doubt about the mirror-image rule stems not from the
rule's content, but from the unwillingness of courts to enforce formal rules of contract formation. The cases involving the statute of
frauds or the parol evidence rule illustrate how courts permit exceptions to overwhelm rules.9 2 Common-law courts may have created enough uncertainty in their own explication of the mirror-image rule to have kept it from working.93 Indeed, subsection (2) of 2207 itself demonstrates this reluctance. In theory, it allows parties
to "channel" their conduct by enabling them to fine-tune the
terms of their bargain. The terms in a particular document that
depart from those that the Code would supply are allowed to govern the transaction. Subsection (2), however, has hardly been a
model of statutory constraint on courts, which are nearly always
ready and'94 able to find an "additional" non-Code term
"material.

If the mirror-image rule were revived, courts might find some
(identifying the need to focus on the market as a whole, rather than on the individuals in it,
to determine the effectiveness of a legal rule).
92 Corbin, for example, writes that:
The statute of frauds and the "parol evidence rule" are sometimes both applied in
a single case. . . . They appear to have a similar purpose, at least when we regard the
latter rule as in truth a rule of admissibility; that purpose is the prevention of successful fraud and perjury. In each case, this purpose is only haltingly attained; and if
attained at all it is at the expense and to the injury of many honest contractors. Both
the statute and the rule may have caused more litigation than they have prevented.
Both may have done more harm than good. Both have been convenient hooks on
which a judge can support a decision actually reached on other grounds. Both are
attempts to determine justice and the truth by a mechanistic device, alike evidencing
a distrust of the capacity of courts and juries to weigh human credibility. And both
alike have forced the courts, in the effort to prevent them from doing gross injustice
to honest men, to make numerous exceptions and fine distinctions, with such resulting complexity and inconsistency that a reasoned statement of their operation requires volumes instead of pages and the case must be rare in which a plausible argument can not be made for deciding either way.
3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 575, at 380 (1950).
'3 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
9'See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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similar avenue to reject a party's terms that they considered unfair. For example, a court might characterize an acknowledgment
form as an "acceptance" rather than a "counteroffer," whose additional and different terms were mere "proposals." Of course, as we
have noted earlier, the courts should be willing to overlook small
variations in a party's form in order to prevent exploitation of the
mirror-image rule by welshers. There is some danger that the
courts may not develop a clear boundary between those variations
that show that a contract has been formed and those that do not.
The absence of such a boundary might create enough uncertainty
that parties at the margin would lack an adequate incentive to
read the forms they received. The mirror-image rule will not work
unless the courts as well as the parties can distinguish between acceptances. with minor variations-in which case the original offer
sets the contract's terms-and genuine counteroffers-in which
case the terms of the second document control. This uncertainty is
most likely to be a problem in situations in which the parties exchange more than one document.
Even if these doubts about judicial willingness and ability to enforce the rule counsel against reintroducing it in its original
breadth, courts could enforce a slightly narrower version. Under 2207, neither seller nor buyer can impose its terms on the transaction in the event of performance. Yet it might be possible to create
a rule that gave one party the power to impose its own terms on
the transaction. Under such a rule, that favored party would still
be held in check when it drafts its terms because of the power of
those who read the form to take their business elsewhere. The goal
of such a modification would be to increase judicial willingness to
impose one party's terms, not by creating exceptions to the rule,
but by reducing the potential for its abuse. A modified mirror-image rule could do this by ensuring that forms were written in a way
that attracted the attention of all who gave forms even a cursory
glance. Consider the following proposal:
LEGENDED ACCEPTANCE
A merchant seller may respond to a merchant buyer's offer with
a writing that bears the legend: "WARNING: Seller will only contract on the basis of the terms set forth in this document and no
other. Acceptance of the goods constitutes acceptance of the terms
set forth on this document."
This document must be sent 10 days before the goods are
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shipped. The legend must be conspicuous, it must be in at least 16point type, and it must be in a color different from the rest of the
document. If the seller employs such a document and the goods are
delivered and accepted, a contract shall exist and the terms in the
seller's legended acceptance shall constitute the terms of the
contract.

A form dictated by this rule would bring attention to itself, making it more likely that marginal buyers would read it.95 Under this

rule, if a seller tried to impose a package of price and terms less
attractive than that of its competitors, it would lose the business of
such buyers. Thus, a mirror-image rule in the form of a legendedacceptance rule might be more readily enforced by the courts and
thereby overcome an important practical objection to the mirrorimage rule itself.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Commentators have subjected 2-207 to sharp scrutiny, lamenting
the inelegance with which the drafters designed their solution to
the battle of the forms and the numerous difficulties which 2-207
appears to have caused. We have argued that most of this commentary misses the point. Underlying the concededly unfortunate
language of 2-207 is the drafters' relatively straightforward desire
to replace formal rules of offer and acceptance, which defer to the
written expressions of the parties, with open-textured standards,
under which the courts search for the fairly achieved bargain of
the parties. If one accepts the drafters' purpose, the actual case law
under 2-207 leaves little to quibble about. We have argued, however, that an equally compelling question about 2-207 concerns not
the means by which the drafters fulfilled their purpose, but the
wisdom of the purpose itself. The drafters of 2-207, like the modern commentators, have too easily dismissed the usefulness of formal rules such as the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and
the mirror-image rule. Though their concern with fairness in bar95 One should note that a seller that used such a form today would probably not enjoy the
benefit of having its own terms. A court would find that the seller's "acknowledgment" was
a seasonable expression of acceptance with proposals for additions that the buyer never
accepted, in which case the buyer's terms would control under 2-207(2). Alternatively, a
court might find that the writings did not form a contract, in which case off-the-rack terms
would control under 2-207(3). It is not likely that a court would find such a form a counteroffer that the buyer accepted by performance. See supra note 17.
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gaining seems itself uncontroversial, it often leads to superficial
analysis of the way in which the legal principles governing commercial transactions can aid or hinder merchants. A system of
commercial law works best when it makes it easy for merchants to
design the contract terms suited to their needs and when it assures
them that the terms they draft will prove binding. Formal rules,
we believe, despite their poor repute in the judicial history of commercial law, may achieve these goals far better than the conventional wisdom has recognized.
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